Police Shooting. Training and getting sued

[CCWInstructor]

I. NEW STUDY: WE'RE GETTING BETTER PREPARED TO WIN ON THE STREET AND IN COURT

Part 1 of a 2-part series


--A high percentage of officers leave law enforcement after they're involved
in a shooting.

--Suspects who try to kill officers are usually drunk, drugged, or deranged.

--When multiple cops are in an armed confrontation, they'll likely
experience "contagion fire" and blast off a wild fusillade of rounds.

--In matters of deadly force, when you're sued, you're screwed.

Right?

Maybe not. Based on a new study of lethal force, it may be time to dump
these and other venerable "truths" about police encounters into the dustbin
of myth.

What is true, according to the latest findings by Dr. Darrell Ross,
long-time police trainer, researcher, and expert witness, is hearteningly
positive: modern training is paying off for officers in high-stress
situations, and the life-or-death decisions they're forced to make "in
nanoseconds" are being overwhelmingly supported in the judicial process.

In short, says Ross, his study reveals "a resounding common trend: We're
getting better prepared for the realities of the street, and we're winning
there and in court."

Because of the select nature of Ross' research sample, "it cannot
necessarily be generalized to all police shootings," observes Dr. Bill
Lewinski, executive director of the Force Science Research Center at
Minnesota State University-Mankato. "But his excellent and important work
brings to light fascinating discoveries about some force encounters that
should encourage and motivate trainers, as well as stimulate additional
research."

Ross, who heads the Dept. of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration at
Western Illinois University, presented his research into suspect behavior,
"contextual cues," and officer performance, during a 4-hr. session at this
year's annual conference of the International Law Enforcement Educators and
Trainers Assn. (ILEETA). He recently supplemented his remarks in lengthy
interviews with Force Science News.

We begin our series of reports on his important findings with his
sometimes-surprising discoveries about officer/subject factors in deadly
clashes and the aftermaths that swirl in the wake of controversial cases.

Ross analyzed roughly "10 years' worth of case material" from 86 lethal
force incidents. These confrontations involved 121 officers from 94
municipal, county, state, and campus LE agencies, large and small, from
across the U.S., although predominantly (45%) from the Central states. All
told, these officers fired 340 shots. Ninety-seven per cent of the suspects
were killed, but all officers survived, although about 4 in 10 suffered
injuries requiring treatment.

"All were high-profile incidents in which I was an expert witness for
officers and their agencies in lawsuits, usually Section 1983 [federal civil
rights] actions," Ross explains. Wrongful and excessive force was
universally alleged. Because of his expert status, Ross had extensive access
to reports, investigative files, crime scene evidence, detailed personal
interviews, depositions, sworn testimony, training records, and other
revealing documentation. He personally visited 65% of the shooting locations
under time and weather conditions that mimicked the event to accurately
perceive the atmosphere.

For the most part, the shootings occurred in 1 of 4 circumstances: the
investigation of a suspicious person or activity (32%), during a domestic
call (20%), during a vehicle stop (18%), or after a vehicle pursuit (15%).

All officers and all suspects were male. Of officers, 55% were white, 30%
black, 15% Asian. Their average age was 34, average time in LE 11 years.
Some 80% had at least 2 years of college. Seventy per cent were working
patrol at the time of the shooting, and for 93%, the shooting analyzed was
their first.

Seining through thousands of facts in his resource pool, Ross has netted a
number of factors that he feels are particularly significant in terms of
force dynamics, training, and performance. Some examples:

SUSPECT DEMOGRAPHICS. In contrast to the persistent belief that most
offenders shot by police are chemically or emotionally disturbed, 85% of the
suspects in Ross' study were sober. A minority (25%) were "mentally
impaired." More than 1/3 had no prior criminal history. "Officers need to be
aware," Ross says, "that they can get dangerous resistance from virtually
anyone. People do crazy wild stuff even sober, and without a hard-core
criminal past."

Also, 65% of the suspects shot were white, challenging the media- and
activist-fueled impression that police deadly force involves "just white
officers killing blacks."

VEHICULAR WEAPONS. Forty per cent of the offenders in this study used or
tried to use a motor vehicle as a weapon, and more than 1/4 of the officers
involved were actually struck--figures that Ross considers surprisingly
high. "Is this a new national trend, or something just true of this sample?"
he wonders. He isn't sure. But training in avoiding vehicular assault, such
as the pioneering program launched for the Tempe (AZ) PD by Sgt. Craig
Stapp, an advisor to the Force Science Research Center, certainly seems
prescient to these circumstances.

MULTIPLE-SHOOTER IMPACT. In all but 3 of Ross' cases there was a lone
suspect and he confronted a lone officer 43% of the time. In 27% of the
encounters, multiple officers were present but only 1 fired. Even when
multiple officers discharged their weapon (usually a Glock handgun), they
averaged just 4 rounds apiece. Media-hyped scenarios in which multiple
officers perforate a single suspect with unrestrained volleys are rare
anomalies indeed, Ross points out. Much more commonly, even in the presence
of other officers "each individual tends to display a disciplined
discernment of threat and an understanding of when it is appropriate for him
to use deadly force."

With multiple rounds flying, "you would think that errant shots might hit
innocent bystanders," Ross notes, "but I found no cases of this."

Interestingly, officers shoot better when they're alone. Those facing a
suspect by themselves delivered their rounds with an 80% accuracy rate. With
multiple officers firing, the group accuracy fell to 60%.

PHYSICAL PRELUDE. Few shootings evolved from a static, flat-footed stance.
In most cases, officers were physically active shortly before shooting,
either conducting a foot pursuit (30%), grappling with the suspect (20%),
and/or exerting other movement (40%). Four out of 10 said they had to shoot
while moving, with 3% firing while being dragged by a vehicle. "All this
affects heart rate, breathing, and other physiological responses, and needs
to be accommodated for in training," Ross says.

He believes officers in the study benefited from a generally high level of
physical fitness. Ninety per cent reported maintaining some type of aerobic
and strength-conditioning workout at least once a week, with 34% hitting the
gym 3-4 days a week and 15% 5 days a week.

COVER. Only 15% of the officers had the luxury of using cover. The rest were
caught unprotected and even if they tried to move to cover, they didn't have
time to reach it before the shooting was over. Amazingly, 1 out of 4 was not
wearing soft body armor.

TIMING. About 75% of the shootings occurred after the involved officer had
been on duty from 4 to 10 hours, from 1/2 to 2/3 into their shift. About 15%
were working overtime. Would this suggest that fatigue may have been a
factor in the decision to shoot? Ross says he detected no evidence of this
in his interviews with the shooters, which typically lasted 3 hours and
extensively probed influences on the officers' frame of mind. "But be
prepared for plaintiffs' attorneys trying to drag this in as a red herring
to bolster a weak case."

FIREARMS TRAINING. Modern training methods were strongly evident in the
shooters' backgrounds. All had trained in shooting from varied positions and
extensively in shooting at night. Seventy-five per cent had practiced
instinct shooting, 85% had experience with Simunitions rounds, and 3/4 had
scenario-based firearms instruction and exposure to FATS-type systems. Forty
per cent had been to a Street Survival Seminar, 55% had trained in reading
body language, and roughly 1/3 practiced mental imagery exercises.

"All this reflects really good academy and in-service training, employing a
wave of techniques that have emerged over the last decade," Ross says. "As
officers and as total personalities, these men were very squared away, well
prepared for their deadly force encounters."

AFTERMATH. Encouragingly, Ross did not find evidence of the profound
personal and professional nosedive that some observers would have us believe
commonly follows in the wake of a shooting. Two years afterward, 90% of the
involved officers were still employed in law enforcement. Indeed, 30% had
achieved promotions in rank and responsibility.

Only 25% said they had experienced post-shooting stress, usually relatively
mild transitory events like nightmares, sleep disruption, temporary
substance abuse, obsessively dwelling on the incident, job and relationship
problems, and such. Twenty per cent said they had experienced some marital
problems in the aftermath, but only half of that group ended up divorcing
and most reported that the special stress of the shooting was only one of
many factors contributing to the split.

Eight out of 10 said their departments were supportive, providing access to
critical incident debriefing, counseling, legal assistance, and/or other
indications of "being behind the officer," Ross reports. "The better the
department gave the officers positive support and encouragement, the better
they were able to deal with post-shooting stress issues."

Having lived through a shooting experience, would the officers hesitate to
pull the trigger if faced with similar circumstances again? Eighty-eight per
cent said No. The 12% who said they might pause, potentially putting their
lives at greater danger, are a "small but important minority," Ross says,
"who represent a training challenge that should not be overlooked."

LEGAL OUTCOME. Overwhelmingly, officers and departments in the study fared
well in the lawsuits against them. More than half won without even going to
trial, when judges ruled in their favor with summary judgments. Of the 1/3
who went to trial, all won, thanks in part to officers "testifying well in
court and writing solid reports," Ross says. Fourteen per cent settled out
of court, (not necessarily indicative of bad cases but more likely of
risk-management jitters, Ross speculates). None was charged criminally.

Even though 35% of the suspects who were shot turned out not to have a
lethal weapon, judges and juries seemed to understand the severe limitations
officers were operating under when making their decisions. For instance, 65%
of the shootings occurred outdoors at night or in low-light conditions. And
while contact with a suspect may have gone on for several minutes, officers
in 95% of the cases had less than 2 seconds (less than 1 second for 70%) to
perceive a sudden threat and react to it. "Legally," Ross points out, "an
officer's force decisions don't have to be perfect, they just have to be
objectively reasonable given the totality of circumstances."

Ross cites several arguments commonly advanced by plaintiffs' expert
witnesses in an effort to discredit the force decisions the officers made in
the cases he reviewed:

--The officer "created the harm or put himself in harm's way" because he
used poor tactics.

--Officers are trained to use lethal force only as a "last resort."

--Officers are trained to use "the least amount of force necessary."

--Officers "must demonstrate a 'rational fear' of an imminent threat to
justify shooting."

--Officers are "directed to use levels of force incrementally over several
seconds;" i.e., to advance gradually, step by step through trial and error,
up the force continuum.

All these assertions are erroneous, Ross insists, and were recognized by
judicial reviewers in his study as not representing modern constitutional
standards.

The strength of Ross' study, he says, is that it highlights "trends and
patterns that officers, trainers, and administrators need to know about.
These are officers who survived on the street and in court because of their
decision-making. Their experiences reflect what's happening in the field.

"Training should be designed to match reality. If you want your officers to
be as successful as these officers, you have to devote the time and money in
training to model what they were challenged to cope with and hope you get
the same results."

[spc]

This report is an excellent demonstration of the usefullness of the new training systems available.
Much of the information available here was gone over in recient training I had an opportunity to experience.
I would like to highly commend CCWI for his putting together a training system that rivals the best available to LEO and is helping save their lives in critical situations.
Expert testimony is also a critical part of what is necessary after the fact to support officer response in decision making and action.

We are very blessed to have an expert who is amongst us and has both of these attributes.
The work and technoligy acheived in the last decade has given our LEO a much better opportunity to do their job with confidence and the knowlege to know they will be backed up with the best scientific information available if the case is taken to court.
Thank You CCWI for the excellent post and for giving our LEO a better chance to prevail in the real world.

spc

[X-ffdo]

Originally Posted by spc

This report is an excellent demonstration of the usefullness of the new training systems available.
Much of the information available here was gone over in recient training I had an opportunity to experience.
I would like to highly commend CCWI for his putting together a training system that rivals the best available to LEO and is helping save their lives in critical situations.
Expert testimony is also a critical part of what is necessary after the fact to support officer response in decision making and action.

We are very blessed to have an expert who is amongst us and has both of these attributes.
The work and technoligy acheived in the last decade has given our LEO a much better opportunity to do their job with confidence and the knowlege to know they will be backed up with the best scientific information available if the case is taken to court.
Thank You CCWI for the excellent post and for giving our LEO a better chance to prevail in the real world.

spc

Roger that...+1.