a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence now a Federal lifetime ban.

[GunSlut]

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. HAYES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07–608. Argued November 10, 2008—Decided February 24, 2009

In 1996, Congress extended the federal Gun Control Act of 1968’s pro-hibition on possession of a firearm by convicted felons to include per-sons convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” 18
U. S. C. §922(g)(9). Responding to a 911 call reporting domestic vio-lence, police officers discovered a rifle in respondent Hayes’s home.Based on this and other evidence, Hayes was charged under §§922(g)(9) and 924(a)(2) with possessing firearms after having beenconvicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The indict-ment identified as the predicate misdemeanor offense Hayes’s 1994conviction for battery against his then-wife, in violation of West Vir-ginia law. Hayes moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his 1994 conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense under §922(g)(9) because West Virginia’s generic battery law did not desig-nate a domestic relationship between aggressor and victim as anelement of the offense. When the District Court denied the motion, Hayes entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that a §922(g)(9) predicate offense must have as an element a domestic relationship between offender and vic-tim.

Held:

A domestic relationship, although it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a §922(g)(9) firearms possession prosecution, need not be a defining element of the predicate offense. Pp. 4–13.
(a) The definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” con-tained in §921(a)(33)(A), imposes two requirements. First, the crime must have, “as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.” §921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Sec-ond, it must be “committed by” a person who has a specified domesticrelationship with the victim. Ibid. The definition does not, however,require the predicate-offense statute to include, as an element, theexistence of that domestic relationship. Instead, it suffices for the Government to charge and prove a prior conviction that was, in fact, for “an offense . . . committed by” the defendant against a spouse orother domestic victim. Pp. 4–9.
(1)
As an initial matter, §921(a)(33)(A)’s use of the singular word“element” suggests that Congress intended to describe only one re-quired element, the use of force. Had Congress also meant to makethe specified relationship a predicate-offense element, it likely would have used the plural “elements,” as it has done in other offense-defining provisions. See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §3559(c)(2)(A). Treating the specified relationship as a predicate-offense element is also awkwardas a matter of syntax. It requires the reader to regard “the use or at-tempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadlyweapon” as an expression modified by the relative clause “committedby.” It is more natural, however, to say a person “commit[s]” an “of-fense” than to say one “commit[s]” a “use.” Pp. 5–6.
(2)
The Fourth Circuit’s textual arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. First, that court noted, clause (ii) is separated fromclause (i)—which defines “misdemeanor”—by a line break and a semicolon, while clause (ii)’s components—force and domestic rela-tionship—are joined in an unbroken word flow. Such less-than-meticulous drafting hardly shows that Congress meant to exclude from §922(g)(9)’s prohibition domestic abusers convicted under ge-neric assault or battery laws. As structured, §921(a)(33)(A) defines“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” by addressing in clause (i) the meaning of “misdemeanor,” and in clause (ii) “crime of domesticviolence.” Because a “crime of domestic violence” involves both a use of force and a domestic relationship, joining these features together in clause (ii) would make sense even if Congress had no design to con-fine laws qualifying under §921(a)(33)(A) to those designating aselements both use of force and domestic relationship. A related statutory provision, 25 U. S. C. §2803(3)(C), indicates that Congress did not ascribe substantive significance to the placement of linebreaks and semicolons in 18 U. S. C. §921(a)(33)(A). Second, the Fourth Circuit relied on the “rule of the last antecedent” to read “committed by” as modifying the immediately preceding use-of-force phrase rather than the earlier word “offense.” The last-antecedent rule, however, “is not an absolute and can assuredly be overcome byother indicia of meaning.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U. S. 20, 26. Applying the rule here would require the Court to accept the unlikelypremises that Congress employed the singular “element” to encom-pass two distinct concepts, and that it adopted the awkward con-struction “commi[t]” a use. The rule, moreover, would render the word “committed” superfluous, for Congress could have conveyed the same meaning by referring simply to “the use . . . of physical force . . . by a current or former spouse . . . .” Pp. 6–9.
(b)
Practical considerations strongly support this Court’s reading of §921(a)(33)(A). By extending the federal firearm prohibition to per-sons convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, §922(g)(9)’s proponents sought to close a loophole: Existing felon-in-possession laws often failed to keep firearms out of the hands of do-mestic abusers, for such offenders generally were not charged with,or convicted of, felonies. Construing §922(g)(9) to exclude the domes-tic abuser convicted under a generic use-of-force statute would frus-trate Congress’ manifest purpose. The statute would have been a dead letter in some two-thirds of the States because, in 1996, onlyabout one-third of them had criminal statutes specifically proscribing domestic violence. Hayes argues that the measure that became§§922(g)(9) and 921(a)(33)(A), though it initially may have had abroadly remedial purpose, was revised and narrowed during the leg-islative process, but his argument is not corroborated by the revisionshe identifies. Indeed, §922(g)(9)’s Senate sponsor observed that a domestic relationship often would not be a designated element of thepredicate offense. Such remarks are “not controlling,” Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 118, but the legislative record is otherwise silent. Pp. 10–12.
(c)
The rule of lenity, on which Hayes also relies, applies only whena statute is ambiguous. Section 921(a)(33)(A)’s definition, though not a model of the careful drafter’s art, is also not “grievous[ly] am-bigu[ous].” Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 831. The text, context, purpose, and what little drafting history there is allpoint in the same direction: Congress defined “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to include an offense “committed by” a person who had a specified domestic relationship with the victim, whether or not the misdemeanor statute itself designates the domestic relationshipas an element of the crime. Pp. 12–13.

482 F. 3d 749, reversed and remanded.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in which THO-MAS, J., joined as to all but Part III. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined.

[GunSlut]

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 07–608

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. RANDY EDWARD
HAYES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[February 24, 2009]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.*
The federal Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §921 et seq., has long prohibited possession of a firearm by any person convicted of a felony. In 1996, Congress extended the prohibition to include persons convicted of “a misde-meanor crime of domestic violence.” §922(g)(9). The definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” contained in §921(a)(33)(A), is at issue in this case. Does that term cover a misdemeanor battery whenever the battered victim was in fact the offender’s spouse (or otherrelation specified in §921(a)(33)(A))? Or, to trigger thepossession ban, must the predicate misdemeanor identifyas an element of the crime a domestic relationship be-tween aggressor and victim? We hold that the domestic relationship, although it must be established beyond areasonable doubt in a §922(g)(9) firearms possessionprosecution, need not be a defining element of the predi-cate offense.

In 2004, law enforcement officers in Marion County,West Virginia, came to the home of Randy Edward Hayes in response to a 911 call reporting domestic violence.Hayes consented to a search of his home, and the officers discovered a rifle. Further investigation revealed that Hayes had recently possessed several other firearms aswell. Based on this evidence, a federal grand jury re-turned an indictment in 2005, charging Hayes, under §§922(g)(9) and 924(a)(2), with three counts of possessingfirearms after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.
The indictment identified Hayes’s predicate misde-meanor crime of domestic violence as a 1994 conviction for battery in violation of West Virginia law.1 The victim of that battery, the indictment alleged, was Hayes’s then-wife—a person who “shared a child in common” withHayes and “who was cohabitating with . . . him as aspouse.” App. 3.2

Asserting that his 1994 West Virginia battery conviction —————— 1West Virginia’s battery statute provides: “[A]ny person [who] unlaw-fully and intentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or pro-voking nature with the person of another or unlawfully and intention-ally causes physical harm to another person, . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” W. Va. Code Ann. §61–2–9(c) (Lexis 2005). 2The indictment stated, in relevant part: “Defendant RANDY EDWARD HAYES’ February 24, 1994 Batteryconviction . . . constituted a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence because: “a. Battery is a misdemeanor under State law in West Virginia; “b. Battery has, as an element, the use and attempted use of physicalforce; “c. Defendant RANDY EDWARD HAYES committed the offense of Battery against the victim: “i. who was his current spouse; and “ii. who was a person with whom he shared a child in common; and “iii. who was cohabitating with and had cohabitated with him as aspouse.” App. 2–3 (bold typeface deleted).

did not qualify as a predicate offense under §922(g)(9),Hayes moved to dismiss the indictment. Section 922(g)(9),Hayes maintained, applies only to persons previously convicted of an offense that has as an element a domestic relationship between aggressor and victim. The West Virginia statute under which he was convicted in 1994,Hayes observed, was a generic battery proscription, not a law designating a domestic relationship between offender and victim as an element of the offense. The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia rejected Hayes’s argument and denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. 377 F. Supp. 2d 540, 541–542 (2005). Hayes then entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed.
In a 2-to-1 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. A §922(g)(9) predicate offense, the Court of Appeals held, must “have as an ele-ment a domestic relationship between the offender and thevictim.” 482 F. 3d 749, 751 (2007). In so ruling, theFourth Circuit created a split between itself and the nine other Courts of Appeals that had previously published opinions deciding the same question.3 According to thosecourts, §922(g)(9) does not require that the offense predi-cate to the defendant’s firearm possession conviction haveas an element a domestic relationship between offenderand victim. We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. ___ (2008), to resolve this conflict.